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Productivity, inequality, and insecurity — ‘These…were the ancient 
preoccupations of economics’. (Galbraith 1970, p. 94) 
In 1970, John Kenneth Galbraith thus summed up the optimism of the era in his 
book, The affluent society. Galbraith’s aim was to challenge the ‘conventional wisdom’ 
which saw economics as the science of scarcity, rather than the successful 
management of affluence. There were very real problems to address, such as the 
waste of resources on the weapons of war, lingering poverty (especially amongst 
African Americans) and the imbalance in quality between publicly provided services 
and privately produced goods, which he memorably summed up as ‘private 
opulence and public squalor’ (Galbraith 1970, p. 212). But the post-war years had 
delivered a new world, where the dominant concerns of the past were of declining 
importance, and none more so than inequality: ‘few things are more evident in 
modern social history than the decline of interest in inequality as an economic issue.’ 
(Galbraith 1970, p. 94). There were many reasons for this. While still profound, 
inequality was not getting worse. Most of the population had a sense of economic 
security. Real incomes for people at the bottom of society had risen dramatically 
while those at the top had stagnated. Even the rich had grudgingly accepted this, 
because: 
Increasing production…has been the great solvent of the tensions associated 
with inequality. Even though the latter persists the awkward conflict which 
its correction implies can be avoided. How much better to concentrate on 
increasing output, a programme on which both the rich and poor can agree, 
since it benefits both. (Galbraith 1970, p. 104) 
Simon Kuznets developed a theory to explain this transformation. As countries 
industrialised, and people moved from agriculture to industry, inequality would 
initially rise as some people became rich and many remained poor. But full 
industrialisation would lead to mass education, higher wages for the workforce, and 
political power for the mass of the population, all of which would in turn lead to 
falling inequality. An inverted U-graph, the ‘Kuznets curve’, gave an aura of 
mathematical certainty to this theory and Kuznets was rewarded with the 1971 
Nobel Prize. Kuznets’ own work was methodical and far more nuanced than the 
common treatment of his curve; in fact he also argued that there were ‘forces in the 
long-term operation of developed countries [that] make for widening inequality in 
the distribution of income,’ including any concentration of wealth in the hands of the 
very rich (cited in Atkinson et al 2011, p. 7). 
It is the optimism of Galbraith and the Kuznets curve which now has the status of 
ancient history. Income inequality has grown significantly in a majority of OECD 
countries in the past 20-30 years, and most alarmingly in the United States, Britain 
and Australia. 
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In this paper, I will begin by outlining the nature of the increase of inequality in the 
rich western economies, and some of the attempts to explain it, using both political 
economy and historical methodologies. Atkinson, Piketty and Saez (2011) reflected 
on their own experience of researching income inequality when they argued: 
Statistical analysis can help us identify independent variation [in income 
dispersion] but it rarely proves fully conclusive. The conclusions that we 
draw inevitably involve elements of judgment. Judgment may be influenced 
by historical narrative. Piketty reached his conclusion regarding the role of 
progressive income taxation in France after an extensive discussion of the 
economic history of France over the twentieth century. While it would be 
reinforced by regression analysis in which the relevant tax rate variable had a 
highly (statistically) significant coefficient of a plausible magnitude, the 
conclusion was based on a reading of the events of the period. 
I will argue that the increase in income inequality in most western countries has 
been the result of deliberate policy, as governments have sought to shift income 
from wages to profits, from low and middle-income earners to those on high 
incomes and to squeeze consumption in order to increase the rewards available for 
investment. I will use Australia as a case study to show that governments have 
experimented with a variety of strategies to increase the rewards for investment. 
Each strategy was a partial success, but as each exhausted its possibilities, another 
was tried. 
Changing income inequality in the OECD 
In 2007, Brandolini and Smeeding used a variety of data sources to examine patterns 
of inequality in many of the rich, western democracies, and how they had changed 
over time. They found that in most countries, income inequality fell in the decades 
just before and after World War II, into the 1970s. The majority of economies then 
saw some period in the last 30 years during which inequality rose significantly. 
In the United States, pre-tax income inequality fell very sharply from 1929 to 1944, 
and for the next 30 years inequality either reduced gradually, or remained constant. 
Then, from the mid-1970s, the process was reversed as the US ‘entered a period of 
unrelenting increases in income inequality.’ In Britain they also found income 
inequality declined substantially in the decade covering World War II and some 
years afterwards, and remaining largely steady until the late 1970s when they 
identified ‘an unprecedented rise of income inequality’ from 1985-90, with the Gini 
index for equivalent disposable income rising an extraordinary 7 points, remaining 
at approximately the new, higher level in the period since. They also find sustained 
but more modest rises in inequality over a long period in Sweden (early 1980s-2000) 
and Germany (1983-2000) and short periods in which income inequality increased 
significantly and enduringly in Canada (1989-2004), Finland (1994-2000), and the 
Netherlands (late 1980s). France is the exception to this picture, with inequality in 
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equivalent disposable income falling right through the post-war period until 1997, 
and then stabilising. The rise in income inequality can be seen in the share of income 
gained by the top 10% or top 1% of income earners in various countries (see Figures 
1, 2, and 3). 
Figure 1: Share of income gained by top 1% of income-earners in various 
English-speaking countries, 1910-2005 
 
Anthony B Atkinson, Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez, ‘Top incomes in the long run of history’, 
in Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 49, no. 1, 2011, pp. 3–71 (p. 41) 
Figure 2: Share of income gained by top 1% of income-earners in various 
European countries, 1900-2005 
 
Anthony B Atkinson, Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez, ‘Top incomes in the long run of history’, 
in Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 49, no. 1, 2011, pp. 3–71 (p. 43) 
Page 6  Phil Griffiths, The creation of inequality 
Figure 3: The top decile income share in the United States, 1917-2007 
 
Source: Anthony B Atkinson, Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez, 2011, ‘Top incomes in the long run 
of history’, in Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 49, no. 1, pp. 3–71 (p. 6)  
Factors increasing income inequality: Skill-biased technical change 
There has been a lively debate over the factors that influence the distribution of 
market outcomes (Gordon and Dew-Becker 2008, Leigh 2003, Levy and Temin 2007). 
Perhaps the dominant explanation for increased income inequality has been the 
impact of skill-biased technical change, in part driven by globalisation (Gordon & 
Dew-Becker 2008; Rajan 2010, pp. 23ff; Helpman 2010, pp. 94ff; ). According to 
Violante (2008): 
Skill-Biased Technical Change…is a shift in the production technology that 
favors skilled (e.g., more educated, more able, more experienced) labor over 
unskilled labor by increasing its relative productivity and, therefore, its 
relative demand… SBTC induces a rise in the skill premium—the ratio of 
skilled to unskilled wages. 
Skill-biased technical change delivers premium wages to those with certain skills, 
and more generally to workers with higher education. This is summed up in the 
concept of the ‘college premium’, the ratio of the average wage of a university 
graduate to the average wage of someone without a university degree. This ratio has 
increased in most western countries, and a substantial literature suggests two main 
reasons. The first is the impact of globalisation, with the production of unskilled, 
labour intensive commodities being outsourced to lower-waged economies, 
reducing their price and also the demand for relatively unskilled labour in the rich 
economies. The second is the rise of production systems reliant on information 
technology, and other advanced technology, that has increased the demand for 
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higher-skilled and better educated workers, as against those with less education. In 
manufacturing, there is a rise in the relative employment of highly educated and 
skilled non-production workers, who receive relatively higher wages. Rajan (2010) 
points to the 2008 Current Population Survey in the United States which showed the 
median wage of high school graduates to be $27,963, while the median wage of 
someone with an undergraduate degree was $48,097 and for someone with a 
professional degrees, $87,775. Many writers have linked the consequent divergence 
in incomes to the supposed deindustrialisation of the United States (and other 
countries), and the failure of their education systems to improve the skills and 
qualifications of enough of their people. Others have pointed to most industries 
showing increased demand for higher education and skills, and over a long period 
of time (Ryscavage 1999). 
There have been a range of criticisms of the skill-biased technical change argument. 
David Card and John E. DiNardo (2002) argued that ‘the evidence linking rising 
wage inequality to SBTC is surprisingly weak’; pointing to a dramatic rise in the 
ratio of the top 90% income decile to the 10% decile income in the United States in 
the early 1980s, while the most dramatic technological change came after that. Card 
and DiNardo see the changing value of the minimum wage as providing the closest 
fit to changes in the 90/10 wage gap. While they do not argue this as the dominant 
reason for rising income inequality, they suggest that changes to the minimum wage 
and other related developments, such as the decline of trade union coverage, 
provide a far stronger explanation (see Figures 4 and 5). 
Figure 4: Real minimum wage, United States of America, 1973-2000 ($ year 
2000) 
 
David Card and John E DiNardo, ‘Skill-biased technological change and rising wage inequality: some 
problems and puzzles’, in Journal of Labor Economics, vol. 20, no. 4, October, 2002, p. 775 
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Figure 5: Normalized 90/10 wage gap plotted against predicted wage gap from 
regression on log of real minimum wage 
 
David Card and John E DiNardo, ‘Skill-biased technological change and rising wage inequality: some 
problems and puzzles’, in Journal of Labor Economics, vol. 20, no. 4, October, 2002, p. 775. 
If Card and DiNardo are right, this would suggest that it is not skill-biased technical 
change itself that shapes income inequality, but the treatment of those workers 
whose career prospects are affected, and who lack skills required by employers. 
Such an interpretation would fit with research done by Alderson, Beckfield and 
Nielsen (2005), which showed that in some OECD countries, the middle-income 
layers of society had been ‘hollowed out’ by rising income inequality, while in 
others, they had not. Yet skill-biased technical change is a feature of all rich 
economies. 
The importance of polarisation at the top of the income distribution 
Alderson, Beckfield and Nielsen (2005) used the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) to 
investigate the extent to which income inequality is a product of relatively lower 
incomes amongst poorer people (‘downgrading’), or relatively higher incomes 
amongst richer people (‘upgrading’), or a combination of the two. They found that in 
most cases, ‘rising inequality is generally associated with polarization, rather than 
upgrading or downgrading alone’, leading to a hollowing-out of the middle income 
layers of society. Furthermore, they found that, ‘among those societies experiencing 
the largest increases in inequality, upgrading typically takes precedence over 
downgrading in the course of such polarization’. In crude terms, the well-off become 
much richer. Britain was the only exception to this pattern; a greater concentration of 
people on relatively lower incomes was the main driver of its sharply rising 
inequality in the 1980s. 
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This general pattern can be seen most clearly in the rapid rise in top incomes. In the 
USA, the share of total income captured by those in the top 10% fell from a peak of 
just under 50% in 1929 to around 32% in the early 1950s and stayed in a band of 33-
35% until 1982 when climbed rapidly back to 50% in 2007 (see Figure 3). 
In 1970, when John Kenneth Galbraith celebrated the decline of inequality as an 
issue, he commented that, ‘It no longer seems likely that the ownership of tangible 
assets of the republic and the disposal of its income will pass into a negligible 
number of hands.’ Yet, within just a few years, this was precisely the way that the 
distribution of income had changed. The richest one-per cent of the population 
appropriated more than half the increase of national income to itself, yet that is what 
has happened in the United States (see Table 1, also Figure 6). Even more remarkable 
is the degree to which the top 0.1% of income earners have captured a 
disproportionate share of national income (see Figure 7).  
As Atkinson, Piketty and Saez (2011) argue, average US growth rates give no 
indication of the experience of most of the population. In the years 1975-2006, 
average real incomes per family in the US grew 32.2%, but if you take out the top 
1%, they grew by just 17.9%. Average real incomes in France over the same period 
grew by 27.1%, 5.1% less than in the United States, but taking out the top 1% of 
earners in France leaves all other incomes growing over the period at 26.4%, 8.5% 
more than in the US. 
Figure 6: Wage income shares of the top 1%, plus percentiles 96-99 and 91-95 
in the US for years 1927-2006 
 
Source: Robert J Gordon, Has the rise in American inequality been exaggerated?, online 
http://faculty-web.at.northwestern.edu/economics/gordon/SFONBER_Combined_090902.pdf. 
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Figure 7: Top 0.1% income shares in the US, France and the UK, 1913-2006 
 
Source: Robert J Gordon, Has the rise in American inequality been exaggerated?, online 
http://faculty-web.at.northwestern.edu/economics/gordon/SFONBER_Combined_090902.pdf. 
Table 1: Top percentile share and average income growth in the United States 
 
Period 
Average 
income 
real annual 
growth 
Bottom 99% 
incomes 
real annual 
growth 
Top 1% 
incomes 
real annual 
growth 
Fraction of 
total growth 
captured by 
top 1% 
1976-2007 1.2% 0.6% 4.4% 58% 
Clinton expansion, 1993-2000 4.0% 2.7% 10.3% 45% 
Bush expansion, 2002-07 3.0% 1.3% 10.1% 65% 
Source: Anthony B Atkinson, Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez, 2011, ‘Top incomes in the long run 
of history’, in Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 49, no. 1, 2011, pp. 3–71 (p. 9). 
 
These findings also challenge the primacy of skill-biased technical change as the core 
explanation for rising income inequality. Not only is the rise in top incomes far 
greater than that suggested by the extra productivity of skilled workers, but few of 
the top income earners are highly educated and skilled non-finance professionals 
(see Table 2). Data assembled by Jon Bakija, Adam Cole and Bradley T Heim (2010) 
suggests that it is managers and executives who have garnered the most extreme 
incomes in the United States. 
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Table 2: Occupations of top 0.1% income earners in USA in 2004 
 
Percentage of primary taxpayers in top 0.1% of the distribution of income (including capital gains) 
that are in each occupation in 2004: Tax return data.  
Source: Jon Bakija, Adam Cole and Bradley T Heim, Jobs and income growth of top earners and the 
causes of changing income inequality: evidence from US tax return data, 2010, online 
http://indiana.edu/~spea/faculty/pdf/heim_JobsIncomeGrowthTopEarners.pdf. 
The impact of tax and welfare regimes on income inequality 
In most western countries where income inequality has increased, the increase has 
been fundamentally driven by increasing inequality of market incomes, while 
changes in tax and welfare regimes have sometimes reduced and sometimes 
increased the impact of market outcomes. This is the explanation of Heisz (2007) for 
the Canadian experience. He argues that there was an increase in the inequality of 
market incomes from 1979 to 2004, but that higher tax rates and increased generosity 
of social assistance and employment assistance through the 1980s acted to 
completely counteract the effect of rising inequality in market incomes for families. 
However in the 1990s, market income inequality grew even more rapidly than in the 
1980s, and the tax and welfare system failed to reduce this polarisation. Frenette, 
Green and Picot (2004) argue that it was the lowering of personal taxes especially on 
the highest incomes, and the welfare reform of 1996 that dramatically reduced 
entitlement to unemployment benefits, that also help account for the rise in 
inequality through the 1990s. Both the increased social assistance of the 1980s and 
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the tax and welfare reforms of the 1990s were deliberate policy decisions with 
predictable impacts on inequality in Canada. 
This pattern was repeated in Sweden, where the impact of taxation and welfare 
transfers actually reduced inequality in equivalent family incomes from 1967 to the 
early 1980s, when inequality began to rise again, in part as a result of tax reform. In 
Finland, a combination of government income policy which compressed differences 
between market wages, and an increase in government transfer payments worked to 
reduce inequality from 1966-76 and then keep it steady until the early 1990s, despite 
a severe recession. However, as with Canada, a change in incomes, welfare and tax 
policies saw a sharp rise in both market and disposable incomes from 1994-2000 
(Brandolini & Smeeding 2007).  
Brandolini and Smeeding (2007) conclude that we can see ‘a general pattern 
suggesting that the redistributive impact of taxes and transfers initially increased 
and then stabilized or dropped in all countries except for the United States’. Clearly, 
government policy has significantly shaped the degree of inequality in disposable 
incomes in the rich western economies, and in almost every case, the most recent 
impact of government policy has been to increase inequality. Nowhere is this more 
true than in the United States. Piketty and Saez (2007) have shown that the 
proportion of income paid in federal taxes by high income earners has been 
dramatically reduced since 1970; and for the top 0.1% of income earners, the 
reduction is more than 50% (see Table 3). 
Table 3: Proportion of income paid in federal taxes by income group: United 
States of America, 1960-2004 
 
Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez, ‘How progressive is the U.S. federal tax system? A historical 
and international perspective’, in Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 21, no. 1, Winter, 2007, pp. 3–24  
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Hacker and Pierson (2010, p. 49) argue that, ‘if the effects of taxation on income at 
the top had been frozen in place in 1970, a very big chunk of the growing distance 
between the superrich and everyone else would disappear.’ While recognising that 
skill-biased technical change had an impact on jobs and wages, they criticised what 
they called ‘the fixation on inequality between large sections of the income 
distribution,’ arguing that it had ‘obscured the extent to which government policy 
has grown more generous towards those at the very top.’ (Hacker and Pierson 2010, 
p. 51)  
The importance of trade union strength 
Most writers on income inequality see the extent and strength of trade union 
organisation as important in limiting income inequality (eg. Ryscavage 1999; Leigh 
2003). This is linked to a widely-held view that the declining income inequality of 
the post-war years was produced by strong trade unions, progressive taxation, low 
unemployment and a generous welfare system (Levy & Temin 2007). John Kenneth 
Galbraith (1956) argued that organised labour exerted a countervailing power 
against that of big business. Richard B Freeman (2008, p. 112) argued strongly that 
collective bargaining ‘reduce(s) the inequality of pay compared to pay in competitive 
markets.’ The Economic Policy Institute (2011 mapped union coverage of employees 
in the USA against income inequality and found a strong inverse correlation. The 
diminishing coverage and strength of unions in the United States is linked to the 
decline in the real value of the minimum wage (see Figure 8). 
Figure 8: Collective bargaining in relation to inequality 
 
Economic Policy Institute, The state of working America, Economic Policy Institute, Washington DC, 
2011, online <http://www.stateofworkingamerica.org/charts/view/124> 
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In his study for the United Nations, John Weeks (2005) concluded that, ‘In countries 
in which inequality increased, this was primarily the result of the decline in the 
importance and bargaining power of organized labour, aggravated by 
unemployment and reductions in government expenditure.’ But for Weeks the 
importance of organised labour is not simply in shaping wages: 
In the long run, the three are closely related, because organized labour has 
historically pressed for full employment policies and a comprehensive 
welfare state. At the risk of oversimplification, it can be concluded that in the 
OECD countries, rising inequality results from a growing imbalance in the 
economic and political power of capital and labour. 
Weeks’ approach helps explain the history of rising inequality in Britain. The 
government of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (1979-90) initiated a series of 
‘reforms’ to the tax system, to unemployment benefits and other forms of welfare all 
contributed to the dramatic increase in inequality 1985-90. This can be seen by 
comparing the Gini index for market incomes, which rose 3 points, with the Gini 
index for disposable incomes, which rose 7 points. In other words, it was deliberate 
government policy to pursue policies which would inevitably increase inequality. 
This surge in inequality was preceded by one of the most significant defeats suffered 
by the British trade union movement in its long history, the year-long miners’ strike 
of 1984-85. The inequality surge came to an end at roughly the same time as the 
Conservative government faced its most profound crisis with the campaign against 
its proposed ‘Community charge’ (popularly known as the ‘poll tax’), which 
replaced the local council rates which were based on the notional rental value of 
housing, with a flat tax on every resident. This was another profoundly regressive 
tax. But its implementation was hampered and by widespread non-payment, part 
spontaneous and part organised, and a long campaign of street protests that 
included a series of riots (Bagguley 1995). By the end of 1990, Margaret Thatcher had 
been forced to resign as Prime Minister, and while the Conservative government 
survived another six and a half years, it was a divided, unpopular and weaker 
administration. The first decision of the new Prime Minister, John Major, was to 
scrap the ‘poll tax’. However, a decline in the rate of unionisation was an enduring 
legacy of Thatcher’s victories over the labour movement. Hacker and Pierson (2010) 
chart a parallel assault on trade union rights in the United States, and link it to rising 
inequality and in particular the ability of managers to drive up their own salaries 
with minimal effective opposition. 
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Case study: income inequality in Australia 
I now turn to examining the development of income inequality in Australia, using 
this as a case study. While the specific economic and political history is unique, it 
also underscores some of the more general themes already mentioned. However, the 
shift that saw the power of unions decline had a very different history from that in 
the United States or Britain, because, for a period, it included the active support of 
trade unions in limiting their own activities. 
Part of the Australian national myth is that it is an egalitarian society. However 
income inequality in Australia is relatively high compared with other rich 
economies. Brandolini and Smeeding (2009, p. 93) compared the Gini indices for 
sixteen rich countries using data from the Luxembourg Income Study for 2008. They 
found Australia was amongst the most unequal, with a Gini index for market 
incomes of 0.48, as bad as the United States and Germany, worse than Finland (0.47), 
Sweden (0.46), the Czech Republic and Canada (0.44) and significantly worse than 
Denmark (0.42), Norway (0.41), Switzerland (0.40) the Netherlands and Romania 
(0.38) and Taiwan (0.33). Once taxation and welfare payments were taken into 
account, Australia’s Gini index for disposable income was 0.32, dramatically worse 
than the least unequal societies, Denmark and the Netherlands (0.23), and worse 
than eleven of the sixteen, with only the UK (0.34), Israel (0.35) and the United States 
(0.37) more unequal.  
After a sustained period in which income inequality declined, from the 1920s to 
early 1970s, Australia has experienced a significant rise in income inequality since 
the mid-1970s. Paul Blacklow (2002) concluded that real equivalent disposable 
income inequality had risen ‘consistently...throughout the period 1975 to 1998-99’, 
with the Gini index rising from 0.273 in 1975-76 to 0.287 in 1984, 0.300 in 1988-89, 
0.307 in 1993-94 and 0.322 in 1998-99. Using a different methodology, the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics (2011) put the Gini index at 0.292 in 1996-97, rising to 0.309 in 
2002-03. The ABS changed its methodology from 2007-08, and recalculated its figures 
for 2003-04 and 2005-06 on the new basis. These showed a very sharp increase, from 
0.306 in 2003-04, to 0.336 in 2007-8 and 0.328 in 2009-10.  One of the key features of 
rising income inequality in Australia has been the large decline in the wages share of 
total factor income, as seen in Figure 9. 
The wages share reached its peak in 1974 at the end of the post-war boom. It then 
declined for the first five years of the Fraser government, before rising again as a 
result of a short-lived boom from 1979-81. The greatest decline in the wages share 
occurred during early years of the Hawke government (1983-91), with a further 
significant decline during the later years of the Howard government and during the 
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global financial crisis. There has been a corresponding increase in the profits share, 
from 17% of GDP to 28% over the past 35 years (see Figure 10). Not surprisingly, 
there has also been a dramatic increase in the share of national income going to the 
very top income earners (see Figure 11). Again, the Australian experience reflects 
that of other rich economies which saw a major decline in top income shares in the 
decades after the World War II; in Australia’s case, the decline extended from the 
period after the World War I through to the early 1980s, with a spike in the early 
1950s associated with a very brief boom in wool prices. It is noticeable that the share 
of top incomes in Australia is dramatically lower than that in the USA. 
It is the argument of this paper that increasing income inequality was the de facto 
policy of every Australian government from 1975 to the present, but that very 
different policies were required at different times to achieve this outcome. 
Figure 9: Wages share of total factor income, Australia 1961-2 to 2009-10 
 
Source Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2011, Australian System of National Accounts, 2009-10: item 
5204.0, 2011, online 
http://www.ausstats.abs.gov.au/ausstats/subscriber.nsf/0/556894E44C26469ECA2577CA00139858
/$File/52040_2009-10.pdf. 
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Figure 10: Profits share of total factor income, Australia, 1961-62 to 2009-10 
 
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2011. Australian System of National Accounts, 2009-10: item 
5204.0, 2011, online 
<http://www.ausstats.abs.gov.au/ausstats/subscriber.nsf/0/556894E44C26469ECA2577CA0013985
8/$File/52040_2009-10.pdf>, retrieved 1/10/2011 
Figure 11: Share of total income gained by top 1%, top 0.5% and top 0.1% of 
income earners in Australia, 1921-2001 
 
Source: AB Atkinson and Andrew Leigh, The distribution of top incomes in Australia, Discussion 
paper no. 514, Centre for Economic and Policy Research, Australian National University, March, 
Canberra, 2006, online <people.anu.edu.au/andrew.leigh/pdf/TopIncomesAustralia.pdf>. 
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The economic crisis of 1974-75 and the turn to promoting inequality 
The shift by Australian governments to actively promote income inequality in 
Australia had its roots in the economic crisis of 1974-75, which erupted shortly after 
the re-election of the Whitlam Labor government in May 1974. At the time, 
government policy swung wildly from Keynesian stimulus to austerity, amidst bitter 
struggles between ministers over policy. Over the previous few years, Australia’s 
trade unions had won pay rises of historic proportions, but inflation was spiralling 
out of control and business was alarmed. Society began to polarise sharply. 
Australia’s strong and well-organised trade union movement attempted to defend 
jobs and to gain wage rises sufficient to maintain their real value as prices rose 
sharply, while the government attempted to restrain wages (Singleton 1990, pp. 30-
45).  
Australia was plunged into one of its most severe political crises, and one result was 
seven years of political impasse, as government, business and unions mobilised to 
attempt to defend their interests against the others. When the impasse ended in 1983, 
with the election of a new Labor government, there was an unprecedented 
restructuring of the economy, but one in which business and those on high incomes 
benefited disproportionately. 
The first step in this process was the political crisis of the Whitlam Labor 
government in 1975. Its attempts to restrain wages and restore profit levels aroused 
bitter hostility with the trade unions who were its main organisational base. 
Working class voters also began to desert the government, angry at its inability to 
deal with the economic crisis. The parliamentary opposition, the business-based 
Liberal and National Party Coalition began a campaign to drive the government 
from office, and were able to block the passage of the national budget through 
parliament in October 1975. The national government was dismissed by the 
Governor-General, the Australian representative of Queen Elizabeth II. Mass strikes 
and street protests erupted in defence of the Whitlam government, and a general 
strike was narrowly averted by the leadership of the Australian Council of Trade 
Union (ACTU), Australia’s peak union organisation. Sir Billy Snedden, the national 
leader of the Liberal Party 1972-75, believed ‘the peace of the country was threatened 
and there could have been insurrection.’ The celebrated public servant, HC Coombs, 
commented that ‘in November 1975 Australia was brought closer to…serious civil 
strife than at any time in its history.’ (Griffiths 2000; Bramble & Kuhn 2011, pp. 94-
100). 
The national election of December 1975 saw a strong majority for the conservative 
parties, led by Malcolm Fraser. At the centre of their agenda was a reduction in 
inflation, a restoration of profit rates, and in their minds this necessitated a reduction 
in real wages, a reduction in taxation, especially for business and high income 
earners, and a reduction of government spending, especially on services such as 
health, education and public housing (Head 1983). This was an agenda aimed at 
increasing income inequality, and this necessarily involved conflict with the trade 
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union movement, yet the means by which the government had been elected had 
polarised the working class and labour movement against the government, and 
created an atmosphere in which many believed that unions needed to prepare for 
confrontation with the government (Singleton 1990, pp. 50-61). Amongst business 
and conservative political organisations, there was a determination to wage a 
campaign to shift the dominant ideas of society from welfarism to an embrace of 
individualism and self-reliance, and to create widespread hostility to the trade union 
movement. The seven years of the Fraser government involved constant, polarised 
conflict with the trade union movement, over a wide range of issues, including its 
refusal to stimulate the economy to reduce high unemployment, its anti-union laws, 
attempts to reduce real wages, and cuts to government spending and services. In the 
late 1970s, a brief economic revival saw some unions win significant pay rises, while 
a new recession in 1982-3 meant that both business and popular support drained 
away from the government. Seven years of government-union hostility, conflict and 
political impasse had failed to resolve the underlying economic problems, and this 
made both business and trade union leaders open to more fundamental 
restructuring of the economy. Such a restructuring would be impossible under a 
government that lacked credibility and legitimacy. Many trade union activists and 
union leaders were also mentally exhausted by the long period of quasi-
confrontation. 
The corporatist strategy of the Hawke-Keating governments, 1983-
96 
In 1983, the Labor Party, led by Bob Hawke, and the leaders of the trade union 
movement, proposed a Prices and Incomes Accord, a corporatist agreement by 
which the trade unions would guarantee industrial peace and wage restraint in 
exchange for a guarantee that the government would protect real wages and 
improve the social wage. Representatives of business and the trade union movement 
would be consulted on economic, tax and social policy. Labor decisively won the 
1983 election and the Accord became the structure for government for much of the 
next decade. 
A few weeks after his election, Prime Minister Hawke convened a national economic 
summit, involving representatives of business, trade unions, state governments and 
some non government organisations. The aim was to get agreement on an economic 
strategy which would raise profits by firmly restraining wages in the hope that 
increased profitability would lead to investment, economic expansion and reduced 
unemployment, all without inflation. The summit’s communiqué is reproduced in 
Stilwell (1986). ‘Business participants...maintain that to achieve the growth in GDP 
and employment on which the nation’s prosperity will depend, increased 
profitability is now essential...’ For its part, the trade union movement accepted ‘that 
while the maintenance of real wages is a key objective, in a period of economic crisis, 
as now applying, it will be an objective over time.’ 
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An economic policy in which the majority of real wages do not rise is one that 
delivers most gains from increased productivity to employers and managers, and 
hence inherently increases income inequality in society. The Accord went further, 
with a series of devices aimed at reducing real wages. There had been a six month 
wages freeze imposed in the final months of the Fraser government, effectively 
reducing real wages. There was a wage discount when the new government’s 
Medicare health insurance scheme was introduced in 1984. In 1985 the government 
argued for partial indexation, in other words, a centralised pay increase that did not 
cover price rises on the basis that the government would cut taxes on average wages.  
In 1986, a new Accord agreement accepted a two-tier wages system which gave a 
small flat increase to wages; plus an additional sum which could only be gained on 
the basis of negotiating changed work practices with employers to increase 
efficiency.  
While prices were monitored, any workplace or union that attempted to force up 
wages beyond the agreed maximum was disciplined; either by the leadership of 
their union, or the ACTU. One union, the Builders’ Labourers’ Federation, was 
deregistered and gradually destroyed for its industrial militancy. This had the 
support of the bulk of union leaders (Bramble 2008). One effect of this wages policy 
can be seen in Figure 12. Workers relying on the legal minimum award wages for 
their occupation and industry found them falling during the life of the Accord, while 
those whose wages were unregulated, including managers and professionals, found 
their real wages rising, with the average remaining largely constant. 
 Figure 12: The growing gap between real average male weekly earnings and 
award (minimum) wages under the Accord, from 1983. 
 
Source: Leigh Harkness, Submission to the Australian Industrial Relations Commission regarding the 
ACTU Living Wage applications, ?1996, online 
<http://www.buoyanteconomies.com/IRC_SUB1.pdf>, p. 5  
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Alongside its wages policies, the Labor government restructured business taxation. 
The statutory rate was reduced, from 46% in 1983 to 36% in 1996, however changes 
in the rules applying to corporate tax had as great an impact, with the effective rate 
of corporate tax declining in the early years of the government, and then rising again 
(see Figure 13). In 1986, fringe benefits tax and a capital gains tax were introduced, 
and these were amongst the few measures to reduce income inequality (Reinhardt & 
Steel 2006). Personal taxes on high income individuals were cut in two main ways. 
The top marginal tax rate was cut in a series of steps from 60% under Fraser, to 47% 
by 1990-91. And the government introduced dividend imputation, which 
dramatically cut income tax on share dividends, a reform which primarily benefited 
the wealthy. Historically, businesses paid company tax, and then when dividends 
were paid to shareholders, they paid income tax on them. Dividend imputation 
meant that shareholders’ income tax was reduced by the amount their shares had 
paid in company tax. The effect can be seen from Table 4. The overall effect of falling 
taxes on high income individuals, was that the average worker gradually paid a 
higher percentage of their income in tax, as seen in Figure 14. 
Figure 13: Statutory and effective corporate tax rates in Australia, 1959-60 to 
2004-05 
 
Source:  Richard FE Warburton AO and Peter Hendy, International comparison of Australia's taxes, 
Report to the Treasurer, Commonwealth of Australia, 2006, online 
<http://comparativetaxation.treasury.gov.au/content/report/downloads/CTR_full.pdf>, p. 140 
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Table 4: Impact of dividend imputation 
 Before dividend 
imputation 
After dividend 
imputation 
Company profit $1000 $1000 
Profit after company tax (@30%) $700 $700 
Dividend to shareholder $700 $700 
Income tax paid by shareholder (at 
top marginal rate of 45%) 
$315 
$700 x 0.45 
$150 
($450 on full $1000 
profit less credit of 
$300 paid in 
company tax) 
Nett shareholder dividend $385 $550 
Figure 14: Marginal and average personal tax rates, Australia 
 
MTAWE is male total average weekly earnings. 
Source:  Richard FE Warburton AO and Peter Hendy, International comparison of Australia's taxes, 
Report to the Treasurer, Commonwealth of Australia, 2006, online 
<http://comparativetaxation.treasury.gov.au/content/report/downloads/CTR_full.pdf>, p. 63 
 
The new government used its popularity and its close relationship with the trade 
union leadership to undertake the most significant restructuring of the economy 
since the creation of the Australian national government in 1901 (Kelly 1994). The 
Australian dollar was floated, banking and many other industries partially 
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deregulated, and this helped drive a major expansion in financial services. At the 
same time, core areas of manufacturing industry were restructured to either make 
them globally competitive or send them offshore. Large numbers of male workers in 
particular lost well-paid jobs, with the government offering retraining and assistance 
finding new careers. The government committed to the globalisation of the economy 
and the effective dismantling of industry protection. This represented an historic 
break with the industry policies of the previous 75 years. The deregulation of the 
airline industry and changes to industrial relations led to a boom in tourism and 
hospitality; while government also reconfigured tertiary education into a major 
export industry. One reason the government was able to successfully restructure the 
economy was that its policies helped spark an investment boom, which in turn 
created hundreds of thousands of jobs after a decade of recession and persistently 
high unemployment and gave some (but not all) of those who had lost their careers 
alternative employment (Kelly 1994; Edwards 2007). They also unleashed a wave of 
speculation, in shares and real estate. 
Table 5: Change in male employment, Australia, 1983-2011 
Period 
New full 
time jobs for 
men % up 
New part 
time jobs for 
men % up 
Increase in 
male under-
employment % up 
Feb 1983 to Feb 
1996: period of 
Labor govt 
273,000 6.9% 103,000 14.4% 138,000 112% 
Feb 1996 to Aug 
2011: Howard, 
Rudd & Gillard 
993,000 23.5% 481,000 91.6% 75,000 28.6% 
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Labour force, item 6202. 
Table 6: Change in female employment, Australia, 1983-2011 
Period 
New full 
time jobs for 
women % up 
New part 
time jobs for 
women % up 
Increase in 
female 
under-
employment % up 
Feb 1983 to Feb 
1996: period of 
Labor govt 
160,000 8.5% 192,000 14.4% 201,000 137% 
Feb 1996 to Aug 
2011: Howard, 
Rudd & Gillard 
771,000 37.6% 862,000 56.4% 152,000 43.7% 
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Labor force, item 6202 
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Borland, Gregory and Sheehan (2001) documented the jobs impact of the 
restructuring of the Hawke-Keating era, 1983-96, which delivered very few full time 
jobs. The trend towards part-time and casual work has been continued now for 30 
years. These changes can be seen in Tables 5 and 6. The changed structure of 
employment helped drive a polarisation in incomes, with a rise in the (small) 
number of highly paid jobs, a dramatic rise in the number of poorly paid jobs, and a 
decline in the middle. There was also a dramatic rise in underemployment, in the 
number of people with some work who wanted longer hours, or a full time job. 
In its early years, the Hawke government improved welfare payments for 
unemployed people and old aged pensioners, introduced additional payments to 
families dependent on welfare and expanded important government services such as 
child care. These had a significant impact on many of the poorest families and had 
the effect of temporarily dampening the overall rise of income inequality. In a 
climate of gradually falling real wages for most occupations, household income 
levels fell less for two reasons: there was a rise in female participation in the 
workforce; and many people benefited from the normal process of promotion to 
better jobs and higher incomes. However this dampening effect was largely 
temporary. The respected welfare economist, Ann Harding, researched income 
inequality for the period from 1982 to 1993-94, which largely covered that of the 
Labor governments led by Bob Hawke and Paul Keating, 1983-96 (Harding 1997). 
While she found some increase in household income inequality for the period, this 
was cancelled out by a small decline in the number of people living in the average 
household and dependent on the average household income. She identified a 
significant increase in market income inequality, with the Gini index for earnings 
increasing from 0.500 in 1982 to 0.537 in 1993-94, but found that the impact of this 
was entirely counteracted by progressive taxation and a significant increase in 
welfare payments for low-income citizens. But behind this benign outcome, she 
found a significant redistribution of income away from middle-income households, 
with a drop of 5.6% in male, full-time wage and salary earners whose incomes were 
between 75% and 125% of the median. About two-thirds of these found themselves 
earning less and a third earning more; figures that reflected the changing job 
situation identified by Borland, Gregory and Sheehan (2001). 
By the end of the Keating government in 1996, the corporatist process of the Accord 
was exhausted. There had been a major recession in 1992-93, which saw 
unemployment reach 11% and a recovery in output which failed to translate into 
employment. Wage restraint, and union cooperation with business and government 
had not protected workers from mass unemployment, economic insecurity, or 
declining standards of government services. By 1991, faced with widespread 
membership discontent and with unemployment rising rapidly, the ACTU 
leadership and government made a major shift in wages policy, agreeing to promote 
enterprise bargaining. This was a partial retreat from centralised wage fixing. But 
enterprise agreements had to be made on the basis that productivity gains were at 
least as great as any wage rise, and then be approved by the quasi-judicial 
Arbitration Commission. Union leaderships now found themselves agreeing to job 
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reductions, reclassification systems and other measures to raise profitability as the 
means to secure nominal wage increases (Bramble 2008). 
The cumulative effect of union cooperation with Labor governments was a 
significant decline in unionism. For many workers and potential members, 
belonging to a union no longer seemed to mean improving wages and working 
conditions, or defending a workplace relations system built around well-paid full-
time jobs for most workers. The union movement remained a significant force in 
workplaces and politics, but it had been greatly weakened and demobilised (see 
Figure 15). 
Figure 15: Rate of unionisation in Australian workforce 
 
Source: Andrew Leigh, What affects inequality? Evidence from time series data, Paper prepared for 
presentation to the Australian Social Policy Conference, University of New South Wales, Sydney, 9 
July, 2003, online <www2.sprc.unsw.edu.au/ASPC2003/papers/Paper78b.pdf>, p 20.  
The Howard government, 1996-2007 
By the time the new conservative government, led by John Howard, was elected, the 
limited compromises of the Hawke/Keating government with the trade union 
movement were no longer necessary. The new Prime Minister, who possessed a life-
long hatred for unions and the politics of economic equality, set out to decisively 
weaken the trade union movement and give employers control over workplace 
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relations. Its broader economic agenda was far less ambitious than that of the 
previous governments. It primarily aimed to manage the market economy 
successfully, and focused on reducing company and income taxes, and partially 
replacing these with a broad-based goods and services tax. All these would 
contribute to a further widening of income inequality. 
The new government began by passing a new Workplace Relations Act that limited 
the legal rights of unions, and in 1998, combined with waterfront employers to 
attempt to destroy the Maritime Union of Australia, one of the most powerful of 
unions. While it failed to destroy the union, it did win a massive cut in waterfront 
jobs. It also put the trade union movement on the defensive, which allowed 
employers to continue to restructure work to increase casualisation and employee 
flexibility. 
Howard’s economic policy included further cuts in the company tax rate, reduced 
from 36% to 30%, and the introduction of a broad-based goods and services tax, 
another regressive measure. On average, welfare payments were maintained in real 
terms, but this meant they fell compared to average wages. The impact of increased 
market income inequality was transmitted to disposable incomes. The mining boom 
of the 2000s, and the fact that there was no recession in the Australian economy from 
1996 until 2011, reduced pressure on the government for radical economic 
restructuring. 
The growing income inequality during the Howard years, along with the decline in 
quality of government services (and especially government schools and hospitals), 
created a sense of discontent within the population, but not one that specifically 
focused on the government. There was widespread awareness of the rise in 
inequality. One of the largest and most reliable surveys of social attitudes in 
Australia is the Australian Survey of Social Attitudes. In 2003, the most recent 
published data, 84% of respondents agreed that ‘there is too much of a difference 
between rich and poor in this country’, up from 61% in 1987 and 66% in 1994. When 
asked about the power of big business, 72% of people in 2001 thought the power of 
big business too great, while 62% of people in 2003 thought business should have 
less power. Some 81% thought the big businesses went unpunished when they broke 
the law. When asked about living standards, 76% of people agreed that their 
standard of living was better than that of their parents at the same age, while 8% 
said it was worse and 15% said it was about the same. However only 48% expected 
their children’s standard of living at the same age to be better than theirs, with 21% 
expecting it to be worse and 25% about the same (Pusey and Turnbull 2005). When 
asked about the best way to improve living standards, 30% thought the each 
individual should look after their own interests first, while 49% thought that it was 
important to look after the community’s interests first (with 21% unable to choose). 
On just about every measure of social attitudes to the economy and business, the 
attitudes of the Australian people ran counter to those of the government, and 
increasingly so during Howard’s term as Prime Minister. 
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This became particularly pointed when the Howard government attempted a radical 
restructure of workplace relations around individual contracts, called WorkChoices, 
with greatly reduced rights for union organising and representation, and reinstated 
an almost unfettered right for most employers to dismiss staff when it suited them. 
The 2003 survey had shown that 2.5 times as many people agreed that individual 
contracts favoured employers over employees compared with those who disagreed; 
and this was proven in practice when the Howard government was defeated on this 
issue in the 2007 election. 
Conclusion 
Society cannot be made more equal, and the horizons of the disadvantaged 
cannot be raised, without some compromise on the part of those already 
advantaged (Maddox 1989, p. 159) 
The normal operation of the capitalist economy puts great economic power in the 
hands of the owners and managers of businesses, and especially in relation to their 
employees. Governments see no alternative but to facilitate the successful and 
profitable operation of business, and this includes protecting business owners from 
potentially harmful action by their employees. 
Left unchecked, the normal operation of business delivers great economic and social 
inequality. Trade unions have been able to reduce this inequality to some extent, by 
raising wages and putting pressure on governments to support the unemployed, the 
sick, the old and other vulnerable people, and to impose progressive taxes on high 
income earners. It is for this reason that John Kenneth Galbraith saw unions playing 
a vital role as a ‘countervailing power’ to that of business (Galbraith 1956). These 
measures have tended to reduce income inequality, but under pressure by business, 
governments in most rich countries have set out to reduce ‘the burden on business’ 
and to weaken the power of trade unions as part of this. In Australia, the major 
achievements in this regard were a product of the Hawke and Keating governments 
from 1983-96, assisted by the leadership of the union movement themselves, even as 
they were weakened by the policies they supported. Their ‘success’ is reflected both 
in a long period of economic expansion, and in a large increase in income inequality, 
including rapidly rising incomes for the top 1% and top 0.1% layer of income 
earners. 
Governments know how to reduce inequality, because they did it successfully in 
most western countries for over thirty years; decent minimum wages, low 
unemployment, high levels of social security and in particular unemployment 
benefits, higher company taxes and high marginal tax rates on high income earners 
were all part of the policy mix until the mid-1970s in most western countries. In most 
of these countries, economic prosperity and low unemployment allowed the 
strengthening of trade unions, even when governments wished to prevent this. 
Governments deliberately and explicitly turned away from this policy agenda in the 
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years after the economic crisis of the mid-1970s, and helped create the rising 
inequality that has followed. They did this because they sought to increase the 
rewards for investment in the hope that this would lead to a revival of job creation. 
In most countries, job creation did revive, but the jobs were far more likely to be low 
paid and casual. And even these limited gains were always vulnerable to recessions, 
in the early 1990s and early 2000s, and now in the wake of the global financial crisis. 
The job gains might have been temporary, but the rise in inequality has been 
relatively permanent. 
And while Australia has not experienced a recession since 1992, it has seen a 
dramatic rise in income inequality. There is little likelihood of any Australian 
government taking unilateral action to reduce this in the near future, given the 
current mobilisation of business against the very modest measures the Gillard 
government has taken. This mobilisation has targeted the special taxes on mining 
superprofits and carbon emissions. Business also wants the industrial relations laws 
amended to further weaken the rights of unions to restrict greater workplace 
flexibility. There is little parallel pressure from the labour movement. 
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